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Sammendrag
Basert p˚a en omfattende undersøkelse blant nordiske investorer har vi avdekket at en ma-
joritet av private equity (PE) fondsinvestorer ogs˚a investerer direkte utenom fondsstruk-
turene. 17 dybdeintervjuer med aktører i PE-bransjen har avdekket at institusjonelle in-
vestorer i økende grad søker koinvesteringer p˚a grunn av lavere honorarer og mer e↵ektiv
kapitalallokering. Institusjonelle investorer er derimot ikke organisert til a˚ fullt ut utnytte
investeringsmulighetene de f˚ar presentert, ettersom den interne strukturen i større grad
er tilpasset forvalterseleksjon fremfor a˚ prosessere koinvesteringer. Soloinvesteringer gjøres
hyppig av familieselskaper, som bruker sin lange tidshorisont og industrielle ekspertise til
a˚ skape verdi gjennom aktivt eierskap i en nisje utenfor fokusomr˚adet til PE-selskaper.
Investorer har tilpasset sine investeringsstrategier med en forventing om flere koinvester-
ingsmuligheter, mens PE-selskaper nøler med a˚ tilby flere. Dette resulterer i en ubalanse
mellom tilbud og etterspørsel av koinvesteringer.
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ABSTRACT
Based on an extensive survey among Nordic investors, we find that a majority of those
investing in private equity are also pursuing direct investments. 17 in-depth interviews
unveil that institutional investors are increasingly seeking to co-invest because of reduced
fees and e cient capital allocation. However, institutional investors are not organized to
fully take advantage of all the opportunities presented, as the internal team structure and
processes are not yet at the maturity level desired by private equity firms. Solo investments
are most commonly pursued by family o ces, which utilize their long-term horizon and
industrial expertise to create value through active ownership in a niche outside the scope of
private equity firms. Discrepancies in views of extent and importance of co-investments have
caused investors to adjust their investment strategies in anticipation of more co-investments,
while private equity firms are reluctant to o↵er more opportunities than currently presented,
causing a mismatch in supply and demand for co-investments.
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I. Introduction
Institutional investors have several alternative investment channels when placing cap-
ital in non-listed (private) equity. Historically, non-listed equity placements have been
performed by committing capital to a private equity fund managed by a specialized fund
manager (GP). The fund manager subsequently invests in portfolio companies on behalf of
their investors (LPs).
Since the credit crunch in 2008/2009, PE deal- and fundraising activity has recovered
towards pre-crisis levels (Bain & Company 2013). However, recent developments show that
long-term backers of buyout-firms, such as large US pension funds and other institutional
investors, are increasingly seeking new ways to extract value from their private equity
portfolios and, at the same time, reducing the overall cost. This is causing the relationship
between GPs and LPs to change. According to Leamon, Lerner & Garcia-Robles (2012),
the relationship between investors and buyout-firms have evolved more over the last five
years than the previous fifty years combined. Furthermore, the forces at play may pose
a threat to the private equity fund model as it is. Reasons for the increased pressure are
numerous, but the essence boils down to one main question: do PE firms provide returns
that justify the costs and associated drawbacks; high fees, misaligned incentives, illiquidity,
limited flexibility and inaccessible top performing funds?
An indication of such alteration in the GP/LP relationship is the rising number of
direct private equity investments, where the investor e↵ectively bypasses the traditional
private equity fund model (Fang, Ivashina & Lerner 2013). This includes deals where the
investor originates and invests alone, solo investments, or deals that are originated by GPs,
co-investments. Preqin (2012) finds that LPs are increasingly seeking to co-invest alongside
trusted fund managers as a means to increase returns on a net-of-fee basis.
The phenomenon of direct investments in private equity is a topic devoted little in-
terest among academics. But the topic has seen a recent increased interest from industry
practitioners and media. Titles such as ”’Solo’ investing makes for good returns”, a web-
publication from Pensions & Investments Magazine, and articles in Forbes Magazine1 and
Financial Times2 are making direct investments a hot topic. This is especially true after
the recent publication of Fang et al. (2013), which is the only academic study on direct in-
vestments we know of to date. They studied detailed investment returns from seven major
institutional investors in the US and found that solo investments outperformed both PE
fund investments and co-investments on a net-of-cost basis. We contribute to the literature
by extending the knowledge provided by Fang et al. (2013) through a deep-dive into the
Nordic private equity scene. In contrast to the quantitative nature of their research, we
study qualitative factors of investing directly in private equity.
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To our knowledge, direct investments in private equity have not yet been studied out-
side the US. Encouraged by frequent appearances of buyout-cases such as Danish pension
fund ATP’s co-investment in Bain’s and Advent’s acquisition of Nordic digital payment
services provider Nets3 and ATP’s and PFA’s direct investment in Dong Energy4 alongside
investment bank Goldman Sachs, we investigate this phenomenon in the Nordic region. Our
research is based on in-depth interviews of 17 players in the Nordic private equity industry.
By obtaining perspectives from both private equity firms (GPs) and their investors (LPs),
we aim to capture the changing dynamics in the LP/GP relationship as well as how this
relates to co- and solo investment activity.
We map the extent of direct investment activity in the Nordics and investigate LPs’
reasons to pursue these types of investments and how they perceive their performance.
We also examine how LPs organize their private equity units and how this relates to their
investment strategy. Moreover, we consider the future outlook of direct investments, as well
as the impact they have on the LP/GP relationship. We will evaluate the implications of
our findings for investors, make suggestions for how they should adapt, and point towards
challenges to be aware of when considering direct investments.
We limit our research to considering di↵erent strategies of investing in private equity.
Our goal is to o↵er insights for investors already seeking exposure to private equity, and do
not compare the di↵erent strategies to investments in other asset classes. Although there
are many di↵erent segments of private equity, we will restrict the scope of this paper to
buyouts5. Hence, references to private equity will denote buyouts only in the remaining
sections.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: The next section gives an overview
of theoretical aspects relevant for the topic at hand. Then we present a brief description of
the method and data applied. The two last sections include a thorough discussion of the
interview material followed by concluding thoughts around our key findings.
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II. Background
In this section, we will present the strategic alternatives in private equity investing: fund
investments, co-investments and solo investments. They all possess distinct characteristics
and theoretic aspects that are important for understanding the value creation process,
and how to evaluate the di↵erent alternatives. This section starts by presenting relevant
literature on private equity funds and the industry’s recent development. Then we delve into
the theoretical aspects of direct investments, co- and solo investments respectively. Lastly,
available research on the performance of direct investments is presented. The theoretical
introduction is followed by a discussion on research questions that arise in the Nordic
context.
A. Private Equity Fund Investments
There are several perspectives on the actual value of PE fund investing. In the article
Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Jensen (1989) claims that private equity is a superior
organizational form over the traditional public corporation in many mature industries.
He argued that this corporate structure combined concentrated ownership stakes, pow-
erful incentives and a lean, e cient organization. High leverage, active governance and
performance-based managerial compensation should in theory reduce agency costs in the
organization, and enable increased returns (Jensen 1989, Kaplan & Stro¨mberg 2009). The
GPs that create the most value, and also do it persistently, exploit a set of value creation
levers. Four important levers that are highlighted in the literature are: deal skills and
informational advantage, leverage optimization, governance improvements and portfolio
company improvements.
On the other hand, there are, from an investor’s perspective, significant costs and
several other drawbacks associated with PE fund investments. There are both fixed and
variable costs associated with investing in a PE fund. The fixed part is referred to as the
management fee, and the variable cost can be split into carried interest, transaction fees
and monitoring fees. Robinson & Sensoy (2013) explains that the typical PE fund follows
a ”2/20/1” rule: a management fee of 2% per year, carried interest of 20% and a GP
ownership of 1% of the total fund size. Even though this is the norm, and is well aligned
with the empirical results based on 542 buyout funds in Robinson & Sensoy’s (2013) study,
there is variation in some of the terms. There are variations both between di↵erent GPs
and between di↵erent periods of time. Transaction and monitoring fees are more variable
and is a potential source of rising costs associated with the investment.
Leamon et al. (2012) highlight three guiding issues behind LP/GP relations that have
been present since the inception of the PE industry. These three issues, alignment, trans-
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parency and governance, are the root of the common drawbacks associated with the PE
model. More specifically, one can say that misaligned incentives and risk profiles, non-
optimal timing of investments, reduced control and flexibility and limited access to top
performing funds are important factors that may reduce an LP’s return.
The empirical evidence that private equity firms create economic value on average is
substantial (Kaplan & Stro¨mberg 2009). However, the total value increase is not only
earned by the PE investors. Pre-buyout shareholders realize a part of the future potential
through a substantial bid premium in the acquisition and the GPs reap much of the profits
through fees. Top performing PE funds create persistent risk adjusted returns well above
the market return (Kaplan & Stro¨mberg 2009), but on average, PE funds struggle to create
excess value for LPs relative to those of public equity investments. Also, the best LP
returns appear concentrated among funds selected by foundations and endowments, rather
than those of typical institutional investors (Fang et al. 2013).
B. Recent development in the PE industry
In recent years, the private equity industry has recovered from the bust in deal activity
following the financial crisis, but is nowhere close to its previous heights and lacks momen-
tum for a new period of growth (Bain & Company 2013). Di↵ering from the PE market
collapse in the late 80s, the credit crunch in sovereign debt and fear of a Euro-zone collapse
have caused recession in parts of Europe. PE funds have struggled to exit their investments
at satisfying prices, as strategic buyers have been reluctant to make acquisitions and the
global IPO climate has been chilly. As a result, several funds have problems realizing their
investments, tying up LP funds and lowering returns (Bain & Company 2013). With funds
tied up, LPs are unable to commit to rounds of fundraising without exceeding their target
PE allocation. Fees are paid for unrealized investments, motivating LPs to look to alterna-
tive ways of getting PE exposure at lower cost. A survey by Preqin (2012) finds that 75%
of the surveyed LPs ask for co-investing rights when committing to new funds. Moreover,
51% state that their motivation is better returns, while 35% state lower fees.
With many GPs having much dry powder6 chasing too few good deals, LPs are likely to
keep looking for new ways of achieving better net PE returns. In recent years, more LPs have
expanded their direct investment program. A recent example is Teachers’ Private Capital,
a part of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan which have conducted 13 direct investments
since 2010 (Bain & Company 2013). Booms and busts have drastically changed the PE
landscape. Still PE funds look much like they did at their inception in the 80s in terms of
structure and relationships with LPs. In a paradigm of low growth and funds unable to exit
their investments, we expect to see changes in how GPs and LPs conduct their business.
Co- and solo investments are interesting examples of this. The theoretical aspects of these
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are discussed in the following sections.
C. Co-investments
Co-investments, in our definition of the term, refer to transactions where LPs invest
alongside GPs (Fang et al. 2013) in a deal originated by the GP. LPs typically acquire
minority stakes in buyouts made available by GPs. After the transaction, the LP will
usually enter a rather passive ownership role with the GP being the driving owner.
Since LPs invest alongside GPs, co-investments generally share many of the drawbacks
and benefits of the PE fund model. The most obvious benefit of co-investments is the
reduced fees relative to the traditional fund investment model. Fees and carry are negotiated
on a deal-by-deal basis (Fang et al. 2013), but are usually either substantially lower or non-
existing. In fact, LPs typically resent paying additional fees in co-investments with GPs
they have already invested with (Fang et al. 2013). The second key feature of this strategy
is that LPs can play an active role in evaluating each presented investment opportunity,
allowing LPs to cherry-pick investments of interest.
Co-investments can give insight into PE firms’ processes and strategies that are usually
not transparent to LPs, displaying the GP’s skill set and o↵ering valuable experience to the
LPs. LP involvement at the deal and target firm management level is usually specified in
a contract between the GP and the LP. LPs can ensure that the contractual terms match
their ambition for involvement. For instance, it is common for large LPs to be represented
on the board of directors of the company they have co-invested in. Increased engagement in
private equity deals through co-investments could potentially prepare LPs to be successful
solo investors.
LPs are usually only allowed to invest in deals made available to them by GPs (although
a recent study by Preqin show that three quarters of the sampled LPs are actively asking for
co-investment opportunities (Preqin 2012)). Hence, there is a potential ”lemons problem”
associated with these deals. That is, GPs utilize the informational advantage over LPs
by o↵ering below average quality deals as co-investment opportunities (Fang et al. 2013).
By reverse causality, the low costs of co-investing could then be viewed as a result of the
quality of the deals o↵ered. Another drawback related to this model of investing is the
limited time LPs typically have to undertake decision support activities and due diligence.
This is further broadens the informational asymmetries between LPs and GPs.
Additionally, co-investments seem to di↵er from traditional fund investments in terms
of the internal resources needed to undertake them. Co-investments require a di↵erent skill
set from that of picking the best private funds. This includes target screening and deal
process skills as well as the ability to improve operational performance and make strategic
choices for portfolio companies. Hence, the cost of acquiring these additional skills will
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a↵ect the return on co-investments (and even more so for solo investments).
Recent developments in GP-LP relationships have brought forth interesting new models
relevant in this context. There have been examples of GPs selling a minority stake in their
firm to one or more LPs (Bain & Company 2013). An LP that owns a stake in the GP has
significantly more influence, as well as access to internal GP knowledge. Co-investments in
this setting see a reduced ”lemons problem” and increase the potential value of knowledge
transfer.
D. Solo investments
Solo investments include deals originated and completed by LPS without involvement
from a PE firm, where the LP acquires either a minority or majority stake in a non-
listed corporation (Fang et al. 2013). This investment form can be viewed as a reaction
and solution to drawbacks inherit in the PE fund model; cost, market timing, deal type
flexibility and ability to source the optimal investment team for each specific case.
Total investment costs in solo investments constitute only internal investment costs and
hired external expertise. How much of these costs that are driven by internal activities will
vary, based on the organizational setup at the LP. An LP that has internalized a complete
investment team is not likely to spend as much on external consultants and advisers, in
contrast to a lean investment team with little or no operational capabilities. The LPs in
Fang et al.’s (2013) study reported an internal cost of direct investing of 0.91% of committed
capital, compared to 0.11% for investing in private equity funds. The LPs also reported a
significant reduction in total investment costs, but as mentioned above the internal cost for
LPs is highly dependent on deal type and internal organization.
As previously stated in the section on co-investments, market timing is an important
driver for direct investments. Agency and incentive issues give rise to the cyclical perfor-
mance of PE funds. Through solo investments, LPs can circumvent these agency issues
and potentially boost their returns over time. LPs may not feel as pressured as GPs to
undertake deals at market peaks and are able to invest in slow markets when few others are
investing. An LP has the option to suspend its investments in private equity for a period. A
source in Fang et al.’s (2013) study commented that they suspended their direct investment
activity completely in the period 2007-2010. Reduced activity for a period will still incur
costs, but how much is highly dependent on the internal organization setup. Extending the
timing argument, having a direct investment program will also provide flexibility in capital
allocations for the LP. Most LPs are obligated to invest a certain percentage of their total
funds in PE. However, such bindings can force LPs to commit capital under circumstances
in which they do not find it optimal, e.g. with second tier funds or at high fee levels. By
having an in-house investment unit, LPs have an alternative to PE funds, leaving them
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with more negotiating power over fees and covenants when committing capital to GPs.
The ability to selectively ”cherry pick” the best deals is highlighted as a major driver for
direct investments in general (Fang et al. 2013). This lever is potentially stronger for the
solo investment case. An LP going solo can pick deals where managers can apply specific
expertise and operational management skills to add value. The LP can specialize (Cressy,
Munari & Malipiero 2007) and in that way limit the internal cost, but still create significant
value. A factor that will undermine this point is if GPs have access to a larger and higher
quality deal base, which indeed might be the case.
The internal organization of the LP’s investment team is a key determinant. It is
a↵ecting the potential cost savings associated with solo investments and what kind of
deals an LP could undertake in a successful manner. The second factor speaking for solo
investments is the flexibility for the LP to compose an investment team that best suits the
specific deal. Given that the LP sources services from actors with competence in specific
areas (e.g. management consultants, investment bankers, lawyers etc.), going solo will
enable the LP to employ the best external expertise available in every case. This point is
also valid for a GP, which might even have better relations to the best actors. However,
GPs having in-house competence are likely to utilize this even though there might be better
external alternatives available. Again, the LP’s relationship to various professional groups
is important to factor into the evaluation.
The main drawbacks of solo investments are related to losing the GPs’ skill set and
reputation. In the traditional LP/GP setting, the LPs should excel in the task of selecting
the best managers. To invest solo, the LPs must step into and fill a GP-like role, including
conducting due-diligence, monitoring management and driving operational improvements
(Fang et al. 2013). These competencies di↵er from the LP’s usual core competencies (?).
This factor constitutes a significant drawback of solo investing. Still, what reduction in
gross returns could we expect to see if the investment was handled by an average LP,
compared to that of a GP?
We split the expertise value-add by GPs into picking the best deals, realizing operational
improvements and transactional experience. In addition to this, the GP’s reputation is
an important factor driving the intermediation value in terms of reducing information
asymmetries with other parties, such as banks and vendors.
There is to our knowledge no significant research on direct investments in the Nordics,
and although the value creation process should be the same, can we expect to see some
di↵erences. Cultural aspects, for example, are one factor that is likely to impact how
significant the di↵erent levers are in this context.
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E. Direct investments as an alternative to private equity fund invest-
ments
The solo investments in Fang et al.’s (2013) U.S sample generally outperformed fund
investments, implying that the low costs of investing solo outweighs the value added by
intermediated investing. Solo investments, as with private equity funds, are cyclical and
most direct funds are invested at times when ex-post performance is relatively poor. How-
ever, investors in the sample did the vast majority of their investments7 in 2004 and 2005,
two years prior to the major bust. This may imply that LPs going solo feel less obligated
to invest in overheated markets, lowering deal activity in periods when valuations are high
and subsequent returns low.
Second, Fang et al. (2013) find that solo investments significantly outperform co-investments.
The co-investment deals in their sample are, on average, significantly larger than the av-
erage solo buyout. This means that some of the di↵erences in performance between solo
and co-investments may be attributed to di↵erence in deal characteristics, where size of
the target company is a factor that negatively a↵ects returns. Moreover, solo investments’
excess performance was found to be less in settings where informational asymmetries be-
tween target companies and investors were small. Such deals include buyouts of companies
located geographically adjacent to the investors and later stage companies conducting little
or no R&D.
The investors in Fang et al.’s (2013) study have significantly larger PE allocations than
the typical Nordic investor in our scope. We find it logical that this will have impacts
on the results and hope to extend the understanding of how smaller investors view and
handle direct investments. This will enable us to get a more complete understanding of the
dynamics of this market.
F. Hypotheses and questions for research
The theoretic overview constitutes the basis for our research on the Nordic landscape
for private equity investments. Available research is either focused on theoretical drivers
or pure financial measures, and in none of these cases focused specifically on the Nordic
region. There are gaps in the literature with regard to how widespread direct investments
are, why investors choose to pursue them, how these deals have performed, how the players
organize and how this a↵ects the market balance between the LPs and GPs.
These gaps give rise to five main overall questions for our research. These will not
completely cover the scope of our discussion, but serve as high-level guiding questions and
will all be addressed. The topic at hand is complex and multifaceted, and we aim to
touch as many as possible through investigating these questions and hopefully discover
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new, interesting ones.
1. Extent - How developed is the direct investment activity in the Nordics and which
type of investors are currently active?
2. Rationale - What reasons other than reduced cost do investors have for conducting
direct investments?
3. Performance - How have solo and co-investments performed compared to traditional
fund investments for these investors?
4. Direct investment process - How have direct investments been carried out in practice
and how are investors organized to facilitate them?
5. Impact and future outlook - How will the relationship between LPs and GPs be a↵ected
by the disintermediation trend?
Today, we do not know the extent of these investment forms in the Nordics. By answer-
ing the first question we contribute by enhancing the understanding of the private equity
market landscape, and comment on how this corresponds to the increased media interest
for direct investments.
The second question is interesting because no research we know of to date provides
a thorough explanation of the reasons for making these types of investments, other than
increasing the net-of-fee return. We seek to investigate both the soft and hard aspects, and
to understand how investment managers evaluate and think about these issues.
The third question is aimed at getting an understanding of how direct investments have
performed compared to traditional fund investments. Findings here will be compared to
the findings in Fang et al.’s (2013) and can potentially enhance our understanding of the
situation in the Nordic setting. Will we find that solo investments have outperformed both
co - and fund investments for Nordic institutional investors as well?
The next question will enhance our understanding of the capabilities and type of or-
ganizations that perform di↵erent types of investments. This information, paired with
how successful they have been, can o↵er valuable insight for investment managers in their
evaluation of strategy and daily operations.
The last question is directed toward whether the increased interest in direct investments
really has made an impact on the relationship between LPs and GPs. Is the trend hyped
or is it in fact changing the dynamics in the private equity market? We seek to get the soft
aspects and deep insights from both of the market participants, the LPs and the GPs, and
based on this comment on the current situation in the Nordics, as well as point to how it
will evolve going forward.
We will compare our answers to existing literature and evaluate what implications our
findings have for investors. With these implications, we will suggest how investors should
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adapt and what challenges to be aware of when considering doing direct investments.
We choose to limit our research to only cover the large investors with substantial capital
allocations to private equity. These include the major pension funds, insurance companies,
banks, asset managers, and family o ces in the Nordics. This is to ensure that investors
in our sample actually has the size, capacity and level of sophistication needed to engage
in co-and/or solo investments.
11
III. Method
Due to the competitive and sensitive manner of the industry, private equity firms rarely
make data on deal-level performance publicly available. Likewise, their investors cannot
share the information they receive from fund managers freely. In order to obtain comparable
and comprehensive data, we chose to conduct a qualitative study from in-depth interviews
of portfolio and fund managers at limited and general partners, respectively.
For our purposes, a qualitative study was preferable over a more quantitative survey
for a number of reasons. Firstly, as most PE fund data is proprietary, we would have been
depending on being handed over performance and deal data from investors and general
partners. The funds and investors most likely to hand over such information would be
the ones showing an above average performance, which could potentially bias our findings.
Our impression from the early stage of our research was that more investors and fund
managers were willing to conduct oral interviews rather than sharing data, reducing the
likelihood of such a positive bias. Moreover, in-depth interviews with a semi-structured
format allow us to dig deeper into topics discovered and hypotheses conceived during the
interviews, which is of great importance in this mostly unexplored area of research. Lastly,
our sample constitutes a diverse mixture of investors and fund managers. Data obtained
from each investor and fund manager would likely not be directly comparable, nor do not
need be consistent. Through interviews, special cases applying to only a subset of the
sample would be easier to discover and provide more insight than a quantitative analysis
of not statistically significant measures.
A. Sampling approach
We categorized the institutional investors in five main brackets; pension funds, insurance
companies, asset managers, banks and family o ces. Next, we built a sample of such
institutional investors in all the Nordic countries, including public and private pension
funds, insurance companies, asset management firms, asset management arms of banks and
family o ces. Only investors with potential for private equity investments exceeding NOK 1
billion were considered, in order for them to have su cient experience to provide meaningful
contributions. Whilst our study holds the perspective of an institutional investor, we sought
to interview general partners to check for any discrepancies between the two respective
groups’ views on the subject and to discover potential connections between the fundraising
climate and direct investment trends.
The investors and funds in our sample were primarily found from web searches on lists
of banks, pension funds, insurance companies and the large asset managers in the Nordic
region. From this base of investors, we approached potential interviewees. Using snowball
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sampling, we asked investors already interviewed or agreeing to be interviewed to suggest
and refer us to other investors and fund managers to contact. As we were interested in
managers focusing on the Nordic region doing deals large enough to attract co-investments,
the PE fund managers were purposely selected based on criteria of investment history, size
and geographic presence in a form of quota sampling.
B. Data
The data was gathered from investors in a three-step process. During the first step, we
screened the investors’ web pages and, when available, annual reports in order to determine
whether the investors invested in any form of private equity. Following this we telephoned
or emailed the investors to clarify whether or not the investor had, either previously or
currently, pursued direct investments (solo or co). If so, we asked for an interview, either
in person or by telephone. There is a complete, anonymized list of LPs and GPs we have
contacted (Total of 53 LPs and 11 GPs) in Appendix B and C.
Every interview was conducted by either two or three members of the research group and
one or two informants from the investor or general partner. Most investor informants were
senior portfolio managers or Head of Private Equity investments, while all general partner
informants were either partners or executives. All but one of the persons interviewed were
male. The length of the interviews ranged from 30-90 minutes, and notes were produced
from every interview. Table I, II and III summarize and provide an overview of contacted
LPs. We see from Table I that a majority of the LPs that have invested in private equity
also have made direct investments, of whom we managed to interview 50%. From Table
II we see that our interview sample contains an overrepresentation of family o ces, seen
relative to the global sample. We do not see this as a potential bias since we treat family
o ces separately throughout our analysis. One important fact to note is that we did not
manage to get interviews with any Finnish or Icelandic investors (See Table III), and this
could be a bias with respect to capturing the full Nordic picture.
There were two distinct interview guides, one for investors and one for general partners,
which were used to structure all interviews. The interview guide for investors consisted of
21 open-ended questions, of which 10 were follow-up questions for certain topics. As for the
interview guide for general partners, the respective numbers were 20 and 7. The interview
guides are available in Appendix D and E.
Individual interviews may su↵er from bias related to a single informant per investor,
not necessarily presenting the full picture. However, there is no reason to believe that this
should result in a systematic bias for the study as a whole.
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Table I: Overview of LPs
Total % of total Interviewed
Total investors contacted 53 100 % 11
Have invested in private equity 37 70 % 11
Have invested directly in private equity 21 40 % 11
Have done solo investments 16 30 % 8
Have done co-investments 17 28 % 7
Table II: Type of LPs
Asset
man-
ager
Bank Family
o ce
Insurance
com-
pany
Pension
fund
Total investors contacted 5 14 5 9 20
Have invested in private equity 1 7 4 7 18
Have invested directly in private equity 1 3 4 3 10
Have done solo investments 1 3 4 1 7
Have done co-investments 1 2 1 3 10
Interviewed 1 1 3 1 5
Table III: LPs by country
DEN FIN ISL NOR SWE
Total investors contacted 19 4 3 17 10
Have invested in private equity 15 4 3 9 6
Have invested directly in private equity 4 4 2 8 3
Have done solo investments 2 3 2 7 2
Have done co-investments 4 4 2 4 3
Interviewed 3 0 0 6 2
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C. Data analysis
Our data consisted of interview notes following roughly the same structure and the
same topics. We had defined five topics of interest that we went through in each interview,
enabling us to categorize and sort the interviewees’ contributions. In order to prioritize
the importance of each finding, we measured the frequency of findings in the interviews.
Hence, arguments mentioned by all interviewees were regarded as more important than
those mentioned by only one. Next we grouped similar findings into broader themes. Our
empirical findings were then compared to those implied by the literature.
We followed the same process for fund manager data. Following this, we compared the
views of the investors and fund managers, identifying similarities and di↵erences.
15
IV. Discussion
In this section, we will present our findings along the five dimensions introduced earlier;
the extent of direct investments in the Nordics, rationale for direct investing, the perfor-
mance of the investments, organization and process set-up, and future outlook. These di-
mensions encapsulate why direct investments are an increasing trend, how investors exploit
them and how this will a↵ect the private equity landscape going forward. Each dimension
comprises a synthesis of our findings with a thorough discussion of their implications. In
light of our findings, we will treat family o ces separately from the other group of institu-
tional investors due to the distinct features we found categorizing family o ces. Thus, in
this section institutional investors will relate to pension funds, insurance companies, banks
and asset managers managing external capital.
A. Extent of Direct Investments
Direct investments are not a new phenomenon in the Nordics. Many banks and in-
surance companies took over companies as indemnification. These holdings would then be
held in a financial portfolio to later be sold. Although not in the manner we typically think
of the private equity business today, this was the first experience with direct ownership for
financial purposes only for many of the banks and insurance companies in our sample.
In the middle of the 1990’s, several Nordic institutional investors began active solo
investing, especially pursuing venture-like investments. This was partly a result of the
US buyout boom of the 80’s reaching the Nordics and the then recent trend of venture
investments in the technology industry. This came along with the first Nordic private equity
firms, where the Swedish firms Industri Kapital8, Nordic Capital9 and EQT10 pioneered the
Nordic buyout segment and raised capital from Nordic, but primarily Swedish, investors.
The Nordic banks and insurance companies now held mixed portfolios of investments in
PE funds, venture and companies unintentionally acquired through their core business.
Most of the seasoned investors we have interviewed began co-investing in the period
2004-2007, a period of all-time highs in terms of deal activity and value (Bain & Company
2013). A rallying market with ever higher valuations11 pushed GPs to larger deals, requiring
additional external capital in order to maintain a balanced portfolio. Only a few of the
interviewees had defined strategies to deliberately seek co-investments at the time. Our
findings are consistent with the findings of Fang et al. (2013), where co-investments in their
sample were negligible before they suddenly skyrocketed in 2005 and peaked in 2007. As
for direct solo investments, two investors in our sample actively pursued them at the time.
The current co-investment trend picked up in 2011/12. At this point, all but one of the
institutional investors in our sample had reshaped their co-investments strategies. There are
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two camps; the actives and the opportunists. The first camp actively search for investment
opportunities and pitch to GPs to show them more deals. What the investors in this camp
have in common are recent strategy shifts to higher private equity allocations, requiring
them to put more capital to work at a higher pace. The opportunists are close to or
fully invested. They consider deals based primarily on increasing allocations to a GP they
are confident in and to increase their net-of-fee returns. The investors that pursued solo
investments in the previous wave had dropped this strategy in favor of co-investments. This
change was at the portfolio managers’ discretion, as their investment mandate had remained
unchanged. Today, only one of the institutional investors engaging in solo investments in
2005-2007 still pursues this, while one other investor has begun solo investing as well.
Family o ces are set apart from the other investors. Their wealth is built from industrial
endeavors and passed on to the next generation, linking the fortune to strong industrial
ties. All the family o ces we interviewed are pursuing solo investments and practice active
ownership. Moreover, their portfolios bear significantly higher exposure to solo investments,
which usually amount to the majority of their holdings. This strategy seems to be consistent
for all the family o ces, and is adapted shortly after the sale of the industrial enterprise
that originally formed the family fortune. Unlike GPs and fund managers, family o ces
tend to keep their solo investments restricted to the industries closely tied to the ones in
which the family wealth was built, hence specializing within the fields where they possess
industrial expertise and know-how.
B. Rationale for Investing Directly
Why do investors in our study choose to pursue direct investments? One would expect to
see a clear strategic rationale given the di↵erent nature of such investments from traditional
fund investments. In the following paragraphs, we discuss the findings on the topic of
rationale from our interviews. We start by discussing co-investments, both from the LPs’
and the GPs’ perspective. Then we investigate our findings on solo investments. We wrap
up with a summary of how these rationales and interests are aligned.
B.1. LPs’ perspectives on co-investments
All LPs interviewed said that reduced cost was the single most important factor for
engaging in Co-investments. Several LPs claimed that the fee structure is basically not
negotiable from the GPs’ side, leaving co-investment as a viable option for reducing the
average cost of investing in PE. ”We try to discuss carry levels, but its very di cult as this
is an industry standard. Funds willing to discuss this are usually having trouble raising
money, and might not be the fund you wish to invest with in the first place”, an investor
17
explained. All other things being equal, co-investments should increase the average net
return to the LP due to the usually non-existent fees, given similar performance as average
PE buyouts on the target company level.
The second most important motive is that co-investments increase the exposure to
favored GPs. Four out of six12 LPs with active co-investment programs described this
as important. The normal fund ticket size13 allotted to the LPs in our sample was often
below the amount the LPs requested. Hence, several LPs are not able to reach their target
PE allocation with their preferred GPs. Investors can in many cases double the amount
invested with one GP through a single co-investment alongside their fund investment.
Another aspect of the allocation motive is the fact that the capital is immediately put
to work, with GPs calling the full amount from the very beginning. This di↵ers vastly from
a normal fund investment, where the investment period can extend for up to five years and
the LP must have capital available throughout that period of time. Additionally, usually
only about 65% of the committed capital is actually called by the GPs (Bain & Company
2013). In this regard, co-investments can be useful when investors want to ramp up private
equity allocation. ”Given that our strategy has changed in terms of the amount allocated
to non-listed equity, we need to put more money to work. Both co- and solo investments
are means to achieve this”, a pension fund highlighted. Co-investments are a means to
smoothing the J-curve14 for PE investments and reducing the problem of committed, yet
uncalled capital earning low returns. As an interviewee points out: ”this gives a simple
mathematical e↵ect improving the IRR of the investment”.
A factor mentioned by two of the six co-investors was the possibility to use co-investments
as a means to balance the risk of their private equity portfolio by being selective in which
of the co-investment deals they choose to pursue. One investment manager explained ”We
own many companies through funds and cannot control industry, timing and risk position.
Co-investments can be a tool to balance our total risk exposure”. Though a valid point,
the modest range of co-investments available to a single investor implies that the potential
of a refined hedging strategy is limited for investors other than the very biggest and most
sought after co-investors. It seems more reasonable to look towards active sourcing of solo
investment to serve this purpose.
The rationales mentioned above came from the institutional investors, and not the one
family o ce engaging in co-investments that we interviewed. This investor invests in funds
with a specific industry focus and target size, and uses co-investment opportunities to build
a position for a possible acquisition of the company in the next round. They only co-invest
in particular industries in which they possess industrial expertise, with the goal to utilize
that competence and run the company after the PE fund sells out. This does not only o↵er
a head start in the acquisition process, but also yields operational insights and continuous
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reports on performance, making it easier for the investor to value the company. Because this
investor invests in funds that are situated on the borderline between venture and buyout,
it is not directly comparable to the larger buyout funds. We still consider it an interesting
strategy that could be transferred to institutional investors engaging in solo investments.
To summarize, we see that there are several reasons for LPs to co-invest. Why, how-
ever, have other investors deliberately decided not to pursue such investments? The infor-
mants we interviewed were generally not worried about the potential existence of a lemons
problem, which was highlighted as a possible explanation of the bad performance of co-
investment deals in the study of Fang et al. (2013). Most LPs trust their GPs and rely
on their previous GP due diligence to be su cient, feeling confident that their own inter-
ests were aligned with those of the GPs. The only example from our sample deviating
from this is the investment arm of a bank. This large manager consistently turns down
all co-investment opportunities, conscious of the potential lemons problem. Moreover, this
investor pointed to the additional skills the management team would require to conduct
proper due diligence to mitigate such a problem. Therefore, they chose to focus on screen-
ing the best GPs and maintaining a good relationship in order to get access to the best
funds. This investor was unique on this point, compared to comparable investors in our
sample, in terms of awareness of potential informational asymmetries and the issues they
may pose.
Another worry shared more generally among the LPs was the uncertainty and loss of
control in terms of deal exit. They feared that GPs may exit deals in a non-optimal time.
Both LPs and GPs commented that exit rights are one of the most important parts of the
shareholders’ agreement. A Danish investor remarked: ”What will happen if other LPs are
unhappy about the investment and want out? We spend a lot of time on the governance
model and alignment of interest between us, the other LPs and the GP. Especially critical
is the exit.”
B.2. GPs’ perspectives on co-investments
The GPs we spoke to mentioned four main scenarios where they would consider o↵ering
co-investments: to satisfy demand from LPs, legitimate a deal, utilizing specific industry
competence and to increase flexibility in terms of deal size.
All except one GP had experienced increased interest for co-investment opportunities.
”Almost all the large systems communicate that they want the
⇥
co-investment
⇤
opportunity,
also in the Nordics”. Hence, GPs are incentivized to o↵er co-investments simply to satisfy
LPs. The GPs in our sample approached this in di↵erent ways. One GP has LPs with
co-investment rights15, three have lists of interested LPs and two give no guarantees and
communicate that they will most likely not o↵er co-investments at all. The only GP that
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had not o↵ered any co-investments was concerned about the issue of which LPs to choose,
and found it better to not o↵er any opportunities at all. Moreover, this GP also valued the
agility associated with operating alone over pleasing LPs with co-investments.
Another important scenario is an LP helping to legitimate a buyout for existing owners.
It could be for political reasons, or that pure PE ownership seems frightening for manage-
ment and founders, given the private equity industry’s public reputation as owners. The
co-investing LPs reputation as a well-established and responsible investor can help calm
sellers, employees and other stakeholders skeptical to the implications of PE ownership.
”We wanted to demonstrate to the general public that we had a large, known investor⇥
co-investing
⇤
, which provided credibility”, a fund manager pointed out. Similarly, this is
important for foreign GPs investing in new markets. In this case, the LP does not only
o↵er credibility, but local networks, influence and cultural understanding as well. These
types of deals are good opportunities for the right LP to co-invest, as their contribution
o↵ers them more negotiating power when discussing terms. On the other hand, there can
be significant reputational downsides involved with being the ”local alibi”.
Three of the GPs mentioned LPs’ abilities as a reason to o↵er co-investments. Our
impression from the interviews is that such LPs are ”nice to have”, but LPs are rarely are
invited to co-invest due to operational expertise. Contributions from LPs may positively
surprise GPs, but just as often add distractions and complicating factors. GPs seem equally
happy with generalist LPs without industrial competence to o↵er. As a GP put it, ”there
are two types of good co-investors; those who provide funds and keep quiet, and those
who contribute with something positive”. Following this chain of thought, pure financial
LPs should focus on professionalizing their internal process of evaluating co-investments in
order to generate as few distractions for the GPs as possible. LPs with specific competences,
resources or contacts could aim to be invited to deals within their field of expertise and
contribute when needed.
GPs often o↵er co-investments to engage in larger deals. Without co-investors, such
deals may result in an unbalanced and risky portfolio. Co-investors provide flexibility
through a larger range of deal sizes. This appears to be more useful for the GPs chasing a
larger span of deals. Could the fact that co-investments often occur in large buyouts a↵ect
LPs’ returns? As one GP commented: ”If you always o↵er co-investments on the largest
deals, the return will most certainly go down, as there is a correlation between size and
return. But the fact that large deals are often o↵ered does not mean that there is a lemons
problem, as large deals often involve less risk”. The co-investment deals in Fang et al.’s
(2013) study were significantly larger than other deals in their sample and the returns lower,
but there was no data implying accordingly lower risk.
There are several reasons for GPs to o↵er co-investments. Nevertheless, GPs expressed
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that they were somewhat conflicted about this trend as well. One GP, heavily oversub-
scribed in its latest fundraising round, without major co-investment pressure commented:
”We don’t want to display our challenges and the way we work internally. The LP is
given access to the board and internal documents. He gets more insight to how we manage
our companies. The LP could be surprised about the way we work. This can be a two-
egded sword, and the e↵ect can be both positive and negative”. GPs choosing to invite
co-investors need to prepare for issues related to transparency and information sharing.
B.3. LPs’ perspectives on solo investments
The rationales for solo investments varied more compared to those of co-investments.
The informants did not clearly state the prospects of reduced cost as an important argument
for their choice of strategy, but focused on other aspects in the value creation process. A
plausible explanation is that cost reductions associated with co-investments are more visible.
However, at least for family o ces, it is more than just pure financial aspects that matter.
One family o ce CEO stated: ”We want to be a counterweight to PE. We don’t want to
support GPs that get rich on management fees”. Specifically, our informants mentioned
risk balancing, increased flexibility in enter and exit timing and strategy, and utilization of
internal core competence as key drivers for why they engaged in this investment form. The
main downsides were the additional risks involved and that internal incentives are not set
up to motivate solo investments. The following paragraphs will discuss these aspects from
the perspective of an LP.
One of the two pension funds in our sample undertaking both fund and solo investments
explained that they actively tried to balance their portfolio with solo investments, having a
preference for stable, lower risk companies as a counterweight to the riskier fund portfolio.
Consequently, they considered minority positions in conservative businesses as well as more
typical PE fund growth cases. Solo investments appear to be a better and more flexible
alternative if the goal is to balance the entire PE portfolio compared to co-investments, as
the investor can actively search for investments within a wider range of risk, industry and
size criteria.
Another benefit of investing outside the typical PE fund structure is the increased
flexibility regarding market timing. The PE fund model of fixed lifespan and pressure to
put money to work can result in sub-optimal decisions, which also a↵ect co-investing LPs.
This is especially true for the timing of entering and exiting a portfolio company. While
PE firms are forced to exit an investment within the lifetime of the fund16, other investors
without such obligations can nurture an investment for decades, either to build it further
or to reap the dividends. The family o ces we spoke to were especially clear on this point:
”We can exploit the long term opportunities that the PE funds can’t”. This flexibility
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opens for long-term investors to pursue solo investments that might not be suitable for
PE firms, thus avoiding some competition. This perspective also requires di↵erent mind-
and skill sets than those often present at PE firms, which again might attract a di↵erent
breed of employee. In the words of a family o ce manager: ”A di↵erent focus in the value
creation process does so that a di↵erent type of people than those who aspire for a PE job
are relevant for the job here. That makes our strategy more sustainable in terms of keeping
the employees”. Family o ces, pension funds, endowments and other long-term investors
considering solo investments should take notice of this competitive advantage.
The family o ces in our study were all engaged in solo investments and almost ex-
clusively invested in companies close to the core competence or industry from which their
wealth arose. To the ones we spoke with, the prospect of simply being a passive financial
investor was not very appealing. Consequently, the purpose of their investment strategy
was not simply to maximize returns within boundaries of risk exposure, but actually re-
flected that the owners found it more meaningful to be active owners and create value on
their own. A family o ce put it this way: ”Our owner is very active and would find it
too boring to simply be a passive investor”. It was also highlighted that when the next
generation takes over, there might be some changes in investment strategy as the industry
specific competence in the family is likely to fade over generations.
All but two institutional investors chose not to engage in solo investments. One of the
main reasons for not doing so is the total risk exposure. A skewed risk profile might be
acceptable for smaller family o ces with a limited number of stakeholders, but large banks,
pension funds and insurance systems may consider risks beyond the purely financial ones
unjustifiable. One interviewee explained: ”This
⇥
solo investments
⇤
involves a whole lot of
di↵erent risks where you take the full responsibility. It is not the type of investments we
are cut out for”. These risks include political, judicial and reputational risks. Another
informant commented that: ”The
⇥
political and cultural
⇤
climate in the Nordics is just
too di cult and risky for a typical pension fund to have a large solo investment program”.
A recent relevant example is the scandal of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund
Global and their (only) solo investment in Delta Topco, the owner of Formula 1 rights,
uncovered by the Norwegian business tabloid Dagens Næringsliv(Gjernes & Skaalmo 2014).
They invested in the firm with prospects of an imminent initial public o↵ering, which
subsequently never happened and is now overshadowed by bribery accusations against CEO
Bernie Ecclestone. NBIM, the fund’s manager, does not have the mandate to invest in
unlisted companies except for opportunities just prior to IPOs. Hence, the situation is very
precarious and shows some of the risks involved with solo investments, especially for such
high-profile institutions17.
Size of the investment operation is another explanation as to why Nordic institutional
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investors tend to avoid solo investments. Di↵ering vastly from GP selection, even passive
solo investments require dedicated personnel to screen companies, evaluate business cases,
handle transactions and monitor the investments. Active ownership requires additional
operational and industrial expertise. Such resources are costly, bearing in mind that the
median private equity investment team size is five professionals for investors in our sam-
ple. Moreover, internal costs over invested capital is a common performance metric that
portfolio managers are measured by. It follows that portfolio managers are not encouraged
to expand their investment teams to handle solo investments. Instead, two of the pension
fund explained that these metrics motivate outsourcing of the unlisted investment activity
to PE funds, as only net returns from PE funds are visible, making the cost of unlisted
investments less transparent. In addition to this, it requires a substantial allocation to solo
investments to make it worthwhile to have in-house solo investment specialists. Although
many institutional investors have the mandate to make solo investments, the portion of
capital they can invest is too small to justify the cost.
Solo investments demand more in-house resources and o↵er less diversification than fund
investments, in addition to exposing the investor to a di↵erent set of risks. It follows that
the net-of-cost returns from solo investments must be significantly higher than those realized
through fund investments to compensate financial investors for the additional e↵ort. Family
o ces are better suited than institutional investors to take on the risks of solo ownership,
having fewer stakeholders and broader objectives.
B.4. Rationale summary
In our discussion of rationale we find several reasons as to why investors pursue direct
investments, and equally, why co-investments are o↵ered by GPs. For co-investing LPs,
there are prospects of higher net returns through reduced fees, increased allocation to
favored GPs and e cient capital deployment. GPs gain increased flexibility in terms of
enlarged deal scope, both in terms of size and base of deals plausible to undertake, the
latter being caused by the co-investor helping to legitimate the deal. Co-investments seem
to improve the e ciency in this market and can potentially increase returns for both LPs
and GPs.
Solo investors seek to balance risk, utilize specialized internal competence or follow a
value creation strategy that di↵ers from the typical PE approach, avoiding competing di-
rectly with PE firms. The risks associated with these investments extend beyond financial
risk, and the potential consequences are closely tied to the number and variety of stakehold-
ers. Family o ces are the type of investor with the most promising prospects to succeed
with such investments.
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C. Performance of Direct Investments
We observed that professional investment managers have several reasons to engage in
co- and or solo investments or to choose not to. Nevertheless, the primary objective for
all managers are increased net returns. Our data set on this point is limited and cannot
provide any statistically reliable answers, but can still o↵er some insight into how Nordic
investors view the performance of these investments.
Three out of six co-investors claim to have obtained better returns from co-investments
than from fund investments. One of these, a pension fund, could show 1.4% higher IRR from
their direct portfolio, compared to that of fund investments. This fund has an internal team
of 12 professionals dedicated to direct investments compared to five in fund investments, and
we should expect the after-internal-cost di↵erence to be slightly lower. The second investor
could show a 26% IRR on exited co-investments, but could not provide comparable fund
data. Nevertheless, the investor was certain that co-investments had outperformed their
fund portfolio. This investor had one team dealing with both co- and fund investments, and
argued that the cost increase associated with co-investments was marginal. The returns
from the last investor’s co-investments had exceeded both its solo- and fund portfolio.
The three other co-investors could not provide insightful information due to few or
no exited investments. One investor had ”a good feeling about their investments so far”,
while the two others indicated pleasing performances of their co-investments. Although
not enough to be conclusive, it is fair to state that Nordic investors are satisfied with their
co-investments’ performance and are optimistic about their future. Hence, none of the
investors in our sample had plans for down-scaling their activities in this area.
Of the three institutional investors that have recently invested solo, only two continue
to pursue such investments. One of these investors has only exited one out of six invest-
ments, doubling their money. The two other investors communicated ”mixed results” and
that their solo portfolios had done ”reasonably well”. Of these, one is currently exiting
solo investments in favor of more co-investments. Going forward, the two investors going
solo plan to obtain minority stakes in well-driven firms in stable industries with energetic
partners managing the companies.
Of the family o ces in our sample, only one had comparable data on both solo in-
vestments and fund investments. They could show to consistently better returns on solo
investments over fund investments. The other family o ces could either not provide data or
did not have any fund investments of size to benchmark against. However, all were pleased
with their solo portfolio performance and would not make any changes to its composition
nor allocation going forward.
Although the data is scarce, co-investments appear to have been the best-performing
private equity category for the institutional investor in our sample. The co-investment
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returns had exceeded their regular fund investments and they did not not communicate
large internal cost increases. The returns from solo investments have varied, causing two
out of three solo investors to alter the course of their direct investment program to co-
investments only.
D. The Direct Investment Process
Among the interviewees in our sample, all pension funds communicated their interest for
co-investments to their GPs. In the following paragraphs, we analyze how investors carry
out these transactions and how they organize their investment units in order to execute
their investments. We provide insights from both investors and fund managers.
The co-investment process is almost always initiated by a GP reaching out to potential
co-investors with an investment case. For obvious reasons, the interviewed GPs tend to limit
their attention to the LPs that are actively asking for co-investment opportunities. None of
the investors in our sample formally required co-investment opportunities for committing
capital to private equity funds, but one interviewee knew of instances where that was the
case. Another investor rather communicated that they ”were there” and were eager to
contribute to co-investments. A large Swedish pension fund said: ”We don’t formalize
demands for co-investments, but sell it !”.
Most LPs in our sample di↵erentiate between cases where the co-investor is involved
early in the deal process and cases where the co-investor is o↵ered a part in the deal
subsequent of the GP closing it. All the LPs in our sample prefer the former. In such
cases, the GP approaches a few potential co-investors, while deals o↵ered after closing
are often o↵ered to all interested LPs and ticket sizes are therefore usually smaller. Also,
some GPs charge fees for co-investing in closed deals. Most of the LPs in our sample only
co-invest with GPs they have already committed to, due to the additional due diligence
(DD) required from investing with a new GP. An interviewed investor explained that a DD
process of a new GP can span from two to six months. For these investors, a thorough GP
DD is su cient when evaluating co-investment opportunities. ”There is not really much
of a di↵erence between screening co-investments and fund investments in terms of the skill
and resources needed”, an investor explained. LPs view solid GP screening as crucial for
successful co-investing. By having strong relations to capable fund managers with proven
track records, LPs are more likely to trust the advice of the GPs. Trusting the GP, they
assume that the investment cases GPs present are trustworthy as well. As a result, these
investors spend little or no time on conducting a commercial DD on their own. As one LP
put it: ”Who are we to second guess their rigid and deep DD?
⇥
...
⇤
We do not challenge or
question the commercial or legal due diligence done by the GP”. Rather, they evaluate how
the co-investment fits in their existing portfolio and spend time on legal alignment- and
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governance structures. Two interviewed LPs do not conduct a full DD on their own, but
rather extend the GP’s business case, talking to target company management and making
reference calls to other investors and industrial contacts. Only one LP does full in-house
DDs for co-investment opportunities they intend to pursue, hiring external consultants and
investment banks for commercial and transactional support.
After the initial decision to invest is made, the LP focuses on aligning their interest with
the GP and other co-investors. Clarifying the future governance structure of the portfolio
company is vital during this phase of the deal. Another important issue emphasized by LPs
and GPs alike is the alignment of interest in terms of exit considerations. This is usually
resolved by including tag/drag-along specifications in the shareholders’ agreement. Tag-
alongs18 e↵ectively obligate the majority shareholder (GP) to include the holdings of the
minority holder (co-investor/LP) in exit negotiations. Drag-alongs19, on the other hand,
are a right that enables the majority shareholder to force the minority shareholder to join
in the sale of the portfolio company. One LP explained that they had never rejected a deal
on the basis of not believing in the business case; the deal breaker was always related to
the shareholders’ agreement and other legal issues.
Five out of six co-investors in our sample remain passive owners throughout the life-
time of their investments, implying that they completely trust the GPs’ ability to run and
improve the performance of the portfolio companies. These passive co-investors seldom
request to be represented in the boardrooms of the companies they own. However, they
sometimes have representation as a direct consequence of the size of their ownership stakes.
In these cases, the co-investor has little influence on how the portfolio company is run
and board representation is primarily meant for monitoring purposes. Only one of the
interviewed co-investors can be classified as an active owner, meaning they are actively in-
volved in decisions a↵ecting the operational and strategic aspects of the portfolio company’s
business.
The median team size of the private equity investment branches of interviewed LPs
in our sample is five members, but this varies significantly across di↵erent investors with
di↵erent strategies. The data also shows large variations in terms of the organization of
the investment teams. While 9 out of 11 LPs have teams devoted exclusively to private
equity investments, the remaining two employ more general alternative investment teams
covering multiple non-listed asset classes. One example is a large Danish pension fund with
an alternative investment team pursuing solo investments in energy and infrastructure as
well as private equity funds and co-investments. In terms of internal organization within the
private equity team, most LPs have chosen to give each professional responsibility for a set of
GPs. Others share GP relations among the entire team, making the private equity unit less
dependent on any singe individual. Only one out of six co-investing LPs interviewed, a large
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pension fund, had a separate team working with direct investments. The rest of the sampled
co-investors do not have dedicated co-investment units, but handle co-investments and fund
investments jointly, hoping strong GP selection will result in promising co-investments
opportunities.
Institutional investors are increasingly pushing for opportunities to co-invest, but are
they able to act on their own requests? In fact, all GPs asserted that most LPs asking for co-
investments do not act on presented opportunities, lacking the necessary resources, ability
or experience. ”Many LPs desire co-investment opportunities, but when the time comes,
there are few that actually follow through due to the fast pace and resource-demanding
nature of the process. There is a gap between what they communicate and how they act
once the opportunity presents itself”, one GP pointed out. In general, GPs urge co-investors
to create separate and agile co-investment units with a clear mandate and decision-making
process, specializing in rapid transaction processing and execution. This di↵ers from the
way most institutional investors organize their private equity units today, with one single
team to handle both co- and fund investments.
The institutional investors that pursue solo investments typically do so in the same
manner as co-investments, in the sense that they usually seek minority positions alongside
a strategic or industrial owner. Their deal sourcing strategy is rather passive, and deals
are most likely to be initiated by approaches from other investors, investment banks or
advisory firms. The only investor still actively seeking solo investments has specific criteria
for deals they may engage in. They require a market cap of at least DKK 1 billion and
partnership with an active owner that can be the energetic part of the process.
Family o ces, on the other hand, tell quite a di↵erent story. They employ more active
deal sourcing strategies, where they look for opportunities to invest in business within their
areas of expertise, in addition to receiving deals from bankers and independent advisers.
One family o ce commented that: ”We look for an EBITDA around NOK 15 million, small
CAPEX, and have for that reason specifically kept away from E&P and O&G”. During
the life of the solo investment, they use their industrial expertise to advise managers in
the businesses they own and o↵er them financial support and consulting services. ”We
implement strong incentive schemes for the managers in the companies we own”. Moreover,
they are actively engaging in M&A and focusing on operational improvements; all known
value creation levers utilized by PE firms. The di↵erence is, as commented by several of the
family o ces, that: ”We apply our interventions in the companies in a more gentle matter,
compared to the situation of a PE ownership”.
To summarize, most LPs prefer to be involved early in the deal process. This is mostly
due to a higher degree of influence in terms of exit decisions and shareholder agreements,
but also to avoid paying fees and competing with other LPs for capital allocations. Co-
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investors typically remain passive owners throughout the lifetime of the investment. Family
o ces, on the other hand, tend to have more active strategies regarding deal sourcing and
ownership role when engaging in solo investments.
E. Impact and Future Outlook
Institutional investors were unisonant in their view of how the environment for co-
investments will develop in the years to come. They expect co-investments to become more
common and formalized as an investment channel. In order to adapt, some of the LPs have
already taken steps to adjust their team composition and work flows to a structure more
suitable to deal with a larger inflow of co-investment opportunities. Hence, their actions
indicate that their expectations of more co-investments are more than a mere guess, but
a definite change they adjust to. GPs should expect to see more LPs being eager to see
investment cases and able to act on short deadlines.
As opposed to the LPs, the GPs in our sample are more di↵erentiated in their view,
ranging from thosw that almost characterized it as a hype to those believing co-investment
will become a normal practice in the near future. The majority of the GPs believed that
some of the interest in co-investments will fade when LPs that consistently have failed
to act on presented opportunities realize they lack the necessary competence or resources
and therefor will stop showing interest. This e↵ect will separate the LPs that actually do
invest from those that do not have the capabilities, resulting in a clearer co-investment
landscape with defined co-investment players. However, the GPs do not seem to be aware
of the lasting changes LPs are making to their organizations and strategies in response
to an increasing number of co-investments. Although many LPs currently asking for, but
not acting on, co-investments are likely to stop asking, the LPs embracing this investment
form will demand an even higher volume of deals. Moreover, the investors positioning
themselves for co-investments are among the largest Nordic investors with significant PE
fund allocations. Most GPs we have spoken to are top-tier fund managers with proven track
records and experience high demand for their services, which is likely to explain why these
investors feel little pressure from LPs to o↵er co-investments. Investors are more concerned
with getting access to their funds than demanding co-investments. The dynamics of the
industry imply that hard-to-access top performing funds should experience little pressure
from LPs in the future as well, but we have reason to believe that GPs showing a track-
record of co-investments should see shorter and easier fundraising campaigns than those
without, all else being equal.
For solo investments, all the investors clearly state that they will not attempt to com-
pete head-on with private equity funds. Two of the investors plan to continue with solo
investments. One will continue to act as a relatively passive partner, while the other as-
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pires to active ownership, but no longer seeks majority ownership in all investments. Both
still consider solo investments as an addition to their private equity portfolio of fund in-
vestments, regarding it the most e cient means to put more capital to work in times of
increased PE allocations. For the family o ces, the situation is di↵erent. They plan to
continue as they do today with long-term active ownership, not making any changes to
their existing business model. These investors benefit from a reputation as milder owners
than PE funds, as well as their long-term horizon and di↵erent return requirements allowing
them to engage in deals unsuited for PE firms, creating a niche for family o ces to build
value and make profits.
No GPs expect a significant increase in solo investments among Nordic LPs. Most
justified this view by pointing to the political climate, egalitarian culture and organizational
restrictions in the Nordics, which they believe will make it very di cult for LPs to exercise
the active ownership required to realize su cient returns. Still, many were familiar with
large foreign direct systems, such as the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, and did
not rule out that some of the largest systems in the Nordics could attempt to do so as
well. One GP explained: ”The really big ones, with teams just as good as buyout teams
elsewhere, can be successful. Others will do the same mistakes as Norwegian and Swedish
pension systems did in the 80’s -
⇥
they
⇤
just took deals as they came through the door.
Not many have been successful, but it can potentially increase. Large systems need to get
their money to work, and are not able to reach their PE allocation targets through funds
alone.”
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V. Conclusion
Nordic institutional investors are communicating significant interest for co-investments.
Co-investments appear to have performed well and LPs show no signs of down-scaling
either their interest nor activity, which contradict the forecasts of most GPs. Large pension
funds, banks and insurance companies have been experimenting with solo investments on
an (primarily) ad hoc basis, with varying returns as a result. Streamlining their investment
strategies, these investors have come to the conclusion that doing deals on their own requires
too many resources and have not o↵ered su cient risk-adjusted returns to be worthwhile.
Co-investments have yielded higher net returns and o↵er more e cient capital deploy-
ment than committing money to funds. This makes co-investments an especially attractive
strategy for LPs struggling to reach their PE allocation targets, as capital committed to
co-investments is called and invested as soon as deals are closed. We suggest that large
institutional investors should rely on fund investments as their primary private equity in-
vestment vehicle, but also attempt to pursue co-investment opportunities.
Although LPs pursue co-investments, they must be aware of what to expect and where to
channel their resources. There is little overlap between picking talented GPs and screening
for target companies, suggesting most LPs should stick to their core business; selecting and
getting access to the best GPs and their funds. Existing investors in a fund are preferred
over outside investors as co-investors, strengthening the argument for LPs to focus on
GP selection and relationships. Moreover, most LPs should not have ambitions of active
ownership, as this increases in-house costs and can do more harm than good to their GP
relation. Co-investing with trusted GPs should be LPs’ top priority. They should aspire
to be GPs’ preferred co-investor and hence see many deal proposals. This strategy requires
an agile team from the LP’s side, along with a clear mandate for deals they can make
and rapid decision-making processes. It could be beneficial, depending on the frequency
of co-investments, to have a dedicated team to handle these processes. Even though many
GPs recommend such an organizational set-up for LPs, most LPs do not yet have this in
place.
A strong brand name is beneficial for LPs, which is likely a driving factor for the number
of co-investment opportunities available. Small and unknown LPs should recognize that
they have little to o↵er GPs other than being of no burden. Instead of having dedicated
co-investment resources, they should aim for e cient processes to be able to take part in
the few opportunities that come their way and maintain strong GP relationships.
It is interesting, and slightly unexpected, that all but one investor in our sample barely
question the business case of presented co-investments opportunities. They conduct little
additional due diligence and rely on their knowledge of and relation to the GP presenting the
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deal. Being aware of the potential lemons problem of co-investments and the discouraging
findings of Fang et al. (2013), one would expect LPs to get a second opinion on the business
cases from a party with other incentives than GPs. Interestingly, the Nordic region has
the highest degree of interpersonal trust20, which is reflected in the business environment
and lowers transaction costs (Economist 2013). The latter is clearly the case for Nordic co-
investments, as engaging external consultants and bankers to review business cases would
turn costly for LPs and, given the relatively small equity tickets in many co-investments,
greatly lower net returns. It would be interesting to research whether this trust in GPs
holds true for investors in regions other than the Nordics as well.
Solo investments expose financial investors to numerous, substantial risks outside their
primary scope of financial risk. The variety of stakeholders and manager performance
metrics inhibit Nordic pension funds and insurance companies from succeeding with solo
investments. Stakeholder acceptance for high salaries and bonuses to the talent required to
run a successful operation in these systems is low, and stakeholders with motives other than
generating the most value could restrict available levers for improvements at the portfolio
company level. Moreover, the political and reputational risks are potentially damaging to
other parts of their business. All these factors imply that financial investors in the Nordics
are unlikely to realize return higher than from fund investments, and may even in the worst
case threaten their ”license to operate”. Therefore, solo investments should be out of scope
for the vast majority of Nordic LPs.
Family o ces di↵er from other institutional investors. They have advantages in terms of
less rigid timing issues, strong operational backgrounds and a broader range of objectives.
These firms can also compete for talent di↵erent from the typical PE fund professional,
which makes this strategy more sustainable in the long run. Consequently, family o ces
are better positioned to pursue solo investments. They should stick to industries they are
familiar with and seek business cases where their industrial expertise is valuable. Likewise,
they should embrace their di↵erences from PE firms, which some selling entrepreneurs and
managers will find appealing.
Going forward, more actors will find their place in the landscape. Today there is an
imbalance between the demand for, and the abilities needed to engage in, co-investments.
LPs have to either focus purely on fund selection or invest in internal competence and
processes to position themselves as a preferred co-investment partner. As more investors
choose a conscious co-investment strategy, the market for direct investments will stabilize.
In the Nordic context there is one large institutional investor rumored21 to face such a
choice of strategy: The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (NGPFG), managed
by the Norwegian Bank Investment Management (NBIM). We have argued that the vast
majority of Nordic institutional investors should not pursue solo investments, but NBIM is
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not a typical Nordic investor. The fund has the size, reputation and sophistication needed
to freely choose which approach to take. The current size of the fund is approximately
USD 850 billion in assets under management, implying a 5% allocation22 to private equity
at USD 43 billion23. Reaching such an extensive allocation target if capital is to be put to
work solely through funds will be a slow process. Seeking to diversify commitments among
many LPs, GPs tend to cap ticket sizes for any single LP. Hence, NBIM must commit
capital to a multitude of PE funds over a long time horizon, making it di cult to cherry-
pick only the top tier funds. A viable option would be to employ an investment strategy
mixing fund investments with direct investments. This strategy would enable a shorter
ramp-up period, as well as reducing the costs of fees to fund managers. NBIM has the scale
to maintain a large team of investment professional to continously source deals, handle
transactions and monitor investments. Being a large and well-reputed investor, NBIM is
an attractive co-investor as well. Moreover, direct investments will make their investment
portfolio more transparent to the public and enlarge the fund’s ability to practice the part
of their investment mandate related to responsible and sustainable investing.
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Appendix A. Illustrations of Private equity investment
vehicles
Private Equity Fund Investments
Co-investments
Solo investments
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Appendix B. Overview of LPs
This appendix provides a list of all LPs contacted, categorized by the information we
were able to obtain. The column headings A-F are specified in the table IV. Column A-
D contains yes/no answers about whether the investor has been active in an investment
form or not. We use an asterix on the ”Yes” answer (Yes*) to specify if the investor was
previously, but not currently, active.
Table IV: Data column descriptions
Column Description
A Has the investor invested in private equity funds?
B Has the investor invested directly in private equity?
C Has the investor invested directly through co-investments?
D Has the investor invested directly through solo-investments?
E The amount of people that are working with private equity investments (funds,
co- and solo-investments)
F How many that are working exclusively with direct investments
G Have we conducted an in-depth interview with the investor?
Investor type Country A B C D E F G
Pension Fund SWE Yes Yes Yes Yes 17 12 Yes
Pension Fund DEN Yes Yes Yes No 10 0 Yes
Family o ce NOR Yes Yes No Yes 3 0 Yes
Family o ce NOR Yes Yes No Yes 5 0 Yes
Family o ce NOR Yes Yes Yes Yes 5 0 Yes
Insurance SWE Yes Yes Yes No 3 0 Yes
Pension Fund DEN Yes Yes Yes Yes 2 0 Yes
Pension Fund DEN Yes Yes Yes No 5 1 Yes
Asset Manager NOR Yes Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes
Pension Fund NOR Yes Yes Yes Yes* 3 0 Yes
Bank NOR Yes Yes* No Yes* 5 0 Yes
Pension Fund ISL Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pension Fund ISL Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank SWE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pension Fund DEN Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pension Fund NOR Yes Yes Yes No
Insurance FIN Yes Yes Yes No
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Bank FIN Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family o ce NOR Yes Yes No Yes
Pension Fund FIN Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurance FIN Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pension Fund DEN Yes No - -
Insurance SWE Yes No - -
Pension Fund DEN Yes No - -
Bank DEN Yes No - -
Bank DEN Yes No - -
Pension Fund SWE Yes No - -
Insurance NOR Yes No - -
Pension Fund DEN Yes No - -
Pension Fund DEN Yes No - -
Bank DEN Yes No - -
Pension Fund DEN Yes No - -
Pension Fund DEN Yes No - -
Bank SWE Yes No - -
Pension Fund ISL Yes No - -
Insurance DEN Yes No - -
Insurance DEN Yes No - -
Asset Manager NOR No No - -
Insurance DEN No No - -
Pension Fund SWE No No - -
Bank SWE No No - -
Asset Manager NOR No No - -
Insurance NOR No No - -
Bank NOR No No - -
Asset Manager DEN No No - -
Bank SWE No No - -
Family o ce NOR No No - -
Bank NOR No No - -
Pension Fund DEN No No - -
Bank DEN No No - -
Asset Manager NOR No No - -
Bank NOR No No - -
Bank SWE No No - -
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Appendix C. Overview of GPs
Country Interviewed? Co-invested?
SWE Yes Yes
NOR Yes Yes
NOR Yes Yes
NOR Yes Yes
DEN Yes No
SWE Yes Yes
FIN
SWE
SWE
NOR
SWE
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Appendix D. Interview guide for LPs
Data
• Investments
– Number of co-investments
– Number of direct investments
– Performance metrics for realized investments (TVPI, IRR)
– Year for entry and exit of investments
• Portfolio
– Total assets under management
– Invested and committed capital to Private Equity
– Capital invested in co- and solo investments
• Organization
– Size of the investment team
– Organization and number of people allocated to direct investments
– Internal costs that occur from the investment activity
Interview
• About investments and performance
– How have direct investments performed relative to fund investments?
⇤ What are your reflections on why these results are as they are?
⇤ What do you see as success or failure factors?
– What is your basis for that you can achieve increased returns with this investment
form?
• About mandate and strategy
– Who initiated the strategy of making direct investments?
– What type of investments are you allowed to engage in, according to internal
mandates?
⇤ Size
⇤ Ownership stake
⇤ Geography
⇤ Industry
⇤ Lifetime
⇤ Size of investment
⇤ Sustainability/ethics
– Do you practice an active ownership style with the companies you have invested
in?
⇤ Do you initiate measures in your portfolio companies?
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⇤ Board representation?
⇤ What are your thoughts on how to run the portfolio companies?
• About structure and internal organization
– Did you make changes/trying to adapt the organization structure when you
started with these investments?
⇤ Did you utilize external competence?
⇤ Did you change internal processes and guidelines?
– Internal organization
⇤ Do you have a separate team to handle direct investments?
⇤ How is the decision-making process on the matter of which investments to
undertake?
⇤ How do you perform and organize the due diligence process prior to direct
investments?
– Do you actively source co-investment opportunities, demand it, or do you handle
them case-by-case if they are o↵ered?
• About future development
– How do you think the extent of direct investments will develop going forward?
– How are you planning to approach these investments going forward?
– Do you plan to change the internal strategy or organization to adapt to these
investments going forward?
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Appendix E. Interview guide for GPs
• Fund
– Assets under management
– Number of co-investments
– Size of investment team
• About co-investments
– Do you o↵er co-investments?
⇤ Which investors do you o↵er co-investments to?
⇤ Why do you o↵er investments to those specific investors?
⇤ What do you view as the ideal co-investor to bring along?
– In what scenarios relevant to o↵er co-investments?
– How has the amount of co-investments developed over time?
– Do LPs ask for co-investments or have this as a criteria for investing in your
fund?
⇤ How has this developed over the years?
• About solo investments
– Have you noticed a trend or an increase in solo investments performed by LPs?
– Why do you think investors pursue solo investments?
– Do you see the potential trend of solo investments as a threat to your business?
– Do you believe investors develop larger in-house investment teams?
– Do you think investors will succeed with this strategy?
⇤ What do you see as the main success criteria? Pitfalls?
– Why do you think it is better to invest through a PE fund, compared to doing
solo investments?
• About the fundraising climate and LP pressure
– How is the LPs negotiation power now compared to earlier?
– Have you altered you terms/fees to raise money for your new funds?
• About future development
– How do you think the Nordic PE market will develop in the years to come?
– How do you see the development in the fundraising climate?
– How do you see the fee and cost structure within the PE industry develop in the
future?
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Notes
1”In Private Equity, the Popularity of Investing Alongside Managers - Not in Their
Funds - Soars”, Forbes Magazine, March 17, 2014
2”Pension plans: Flying solo”, Financial Times, September 9, 2013
3http://www.adventinternational.com/news/PressReleases/pages/PressRelease24032014 English.aspx
4http://www.ipe.com/atp-pfa-to-invest-dkk3bn-in-controversial-dong-energy-
deal/10000876.article
5Other common segments are venture capital, growth capital, distressed securities and
mezzanine capital.
6The part of a fund’s committed capital that has not yet been invested.
7In terms of both deal value and number of deals.
8Now IK Investment Partners, founded in 1989.
9Founded in 1989.
10Founded in 1994.
11Per 2012, 9 out of the 10 largest buyouts ever originated from this period. In 2013, the
takeovers of Dell and Heinz joined the ranks of top 10 mega deals.
12There are seven LPs in our sample that has been engaged in co-investments. One of
them is currently not active and has not been recently.
13The equity ticket is the amount an LP is allowed to invest in a fund.
14The J-curve is used to illustrate the historical tendency of private equity funds to
deliver negative returns in the early years and investment gains in the outlying years as the
portfolios of companies mature (Grabenwarter & Weidig 2005).
15An LP with a co-investment right has the right to co-invest if the GP seeks co-investors
in a deal.
16There are funds that can roll an investment over to a new fund, while other funds have
flexible duration.
17”Innrømmer at Oljefondets Formel 1-investering var bom”
42
http://www.aftenposten.no/okonomi/Innrommer-at-Oljefondets-Formel-1-investering-
var-bom-7497903.html
18A contractual obligation used to protect a minority shareholder (usually in a venture
capital deal). If a majority shareholder sells his or her stake, then the minority shareholder
has the right to join the transaction and sell his or her minority stake in the company.
(http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tagalongrights.asp)
19A right that enables a majority shareholder to force a minority shareholder to
join in the sale of a company. The majority owner doing the dragging must give
the minority shareholder the same price, terms, and conditions as any other seller.
(http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dragalongrights.asp)
20Score of interpersonal trust, World Values Survey Wave 5 (2005-2008) by World Value
Surveys.
21There is a current discussion of whether NBIM should be allowed
to invest in non-listed equity. ”Norge bør g˚a inn i private equity”
(http://www.dn.no/nyheter/2014/04/03/Finans/-norge-br-g-inni-private-equity), ”Unng˚a
dyr tabbe” (http://www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2014/03/20/Oljefondet/unnga-dyr-
tabbe?service=print).
22A 5% PE allocation is equivalent to the fund’s current real estate allocation.
23As references, Canada Pension Plan and California Public Employees’ Retirement Sys-
tem currently have USD 37 and 30 billion allocated to private equity respectively, both with
significant portions dedicated to direct investments. These institutions have built successful
internal buyout teams, thereby setting terms for the private equity scene worldwide.
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